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 1 
A ‘brooding oppressive shadow’? The Labour alliance, the ‘trade union question’ 
and the trajectory of revisionist social democracy, c. 1969-1975 
 
Abstract 
 
Conventional accounts of the decision of a group of influential British Labour MPs to 
leave the party in 1981 to found the new Social Democratic Party (SDP) focus on more 
immediate intra-party constitutional reforms after 1979, or on party divisions over the 
single question of Britain’s membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). 
This article suggests that a wider array of longer-term factors informed the decision to 
seek an alternative vehicle of social democracy, particularly the critical response to the 
so-called ‘trade union question’ in British and Labour politics from the late 1960s. It 
identifies the centrality and cumulative role of a new ‘post-revisionist’ social democratic 
critique of the privileged position and influence of an increasingly assertive (left-wing) 
trade unionism after the failure of Labour’s In Place of Strife legislation in 1969 in the 
later schism of British social democracy. 
 
Keywords: Labour Party; trade unions; revisionist social democracy; Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) 
 
 2 
Introduction 
 
Social democratic policies…must be backed by a renewed emphasis on 
parliamentary democracy and debate. The current drift to government by sit-
in, confrontation and defiance of the law only aids those with special positions 
of power in the community and is utterly at variance with the social 
democratic belief that priority goes to those with a just case established by 
open debate and the process of representative government. As part of this, the 
Labour Party should try to eliminate any position of special power accorded to 
pressure groups within its own constitution and should give each citizen who 
joins the Labour Party an equal chance of influencing its policies.1 
 
This article examines differential attitudes and responses to issues of industrial relations 
and trade union reform in the Labour Party in a tumultuous and transformative period for 
British social democracy. Particularly, it attempts to establish the extent to which the so-
called ‘trade union question’ in British politics from the late 1960s formed the crucial 
back-drop and underlying cause of the subsequent alienation of revisionist social 
                                                 
1 John P. Mackintosh, ‘Socialism or social democracy? The choice for the Labour Party’, Political 
Quarterly, 43, 4 (1972), 483-4; also see John P. Mackintosh, ‘The case for a realignment of the left’, The 
Times, 22 July 1977. Writing on the prospects of the 1977 Lib-Lab pact for a future centre-left realignment 
of British politics, Mackintosh believed that such a party, freed from the institutional constraints and 
limitations of the trade unions, ‘would be free to press for what it saw as the national interest’ and could be 
‘far more radical on many issues’. 
 3 
democrats in Labour’s ranks, the rupture of British social democracy and the formation of 
a new Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981.2 
 
Previous accounts of Labour’s social democratic fissure and the origins of the new SDP 
have tended to reduce explanation to one (or a combination) of two main factors: intra-
party divisions created by more immediate party constitutional changes after the 1979 
general election defeat, or the dominant single issue of divisions over the merits of 
Britain’s recent accession to the European Economic Community (EEC). Accounts that 
emphasise only short-term political and policy factors identify the catalyst as critical 
constitutional changes, which had the cumulative effect of transferring greater power of 
decision-making to their left-wing and trade union opponents in the party’s federal 
structure, immediately prior to the decision to leave Labour to found the SDP in 1981.3 
Recent work has also explored critical debates and divisions of revisionist social 
democracy in the Labour Party in the 1960s and 1970s in terms of differential attitudes to 
British membership of the EEC and its role in the subsequent party split and formation of 
the SDP.4 While bitter European divisions served to further marginalise and alienate an 
                                                 
2 See Lewis Minkin, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party (Edinburgh, 1991), 
208-9; also see Steve Ludlam, ‘Norms and blocks: Trade unions and the Labour party since 1964’, in Brian 
Brivati and Richard Heffernan (eds), The Labour Party: A Centenary History (Basingstoke, 2000), 220. 
3 See Ivor Crewe and Anthony King, SDP: The Birth, Life and Death of the Social Democratic Party 
(Oxford, 1995), 28-40, 106-7; Radhika Desai, Intellectuals and Socialism: ‘Social Democrats’ and the 
Labour Party (London, 1994), 145-152, 162; David Owen, Time to Declare (London, 1991), 435-37, 447, 
469-71; Hugh Stephenson, Claret and Chips: The Rise of the SDP (London, 1982), 49. 
4 Stephen Meredith, 'A catalyst for secession? European divisions on the parliamentary right of the Labour 
party 1962-72 and the schism of British social democracy', Historical Research, 85, 228 (2012), 329-51; 
also see Desai, Intellectuals, 145-152, 162; and see Crewe and King, SDP, 106-7, who argue that it was not 
‘passionate commitment to Europe’ that ‘bound the SDP defectors together’. 
 4 
influential group of revisionist social democrats, both explanations neglect the 
significance of a wider array of factors and the longer-term evolution of the SDP. The 
emphasis and argument here is not that the trade union issue worked as the discrete 
principal source of (post-) revisionist social democratic ‘dissent’ and dissatisfaction with 
the party, but that the roots of the split reached further back than immediate intra-party 
constitutional disputes after 1979 and that it was more than a party split over the single 
policy issue of Europe. Dilemmas of industrial relations and trade union reform were a 
central part of a wider prospectus of connected themes and developments underlying a 
strong evolving new social democratic critique of mainstream party management and 
policy. These included resentment at hostile, inconsistent or ambivalent approaches to 
their ‘article of faith’ that was European membership and a growing anxiety over the 
perceived limits of traditional social democratic political economy in terms of its relative 
commitment to public spending and wealth creation.5  In effect, the later split was the 
culmination of a gradual process of alienation within the wider Labour Party in relation to 
multiple policy and party management issues, from both the increasingly influential 
socialist Labour left and the more traditional ‘trade union right’, for Labour’s self-
proclaimed ‘radical [social democratic] right’. 
 
Broader accounts of the trade union role in British politics and the Labour Party in 
the 1970s have attempted to stem the ‘myth’ of all-powerful unrepresentative and 
undemocratic trade union barons imposing their will on acquiescent governments and a 
supine party. Robert Taylor, for instance, has identified the drivers of wage planning, 
                                                 
5 Meredith, 'catalyst’; Stephen Meredith, ‘Labour Party revisionism and public expenditure: Divisions of 
social democratic political economy in the 1970s’, Labour History Review, 70, 3 (2005), 253-73. 
 5 
economic development councils and wider corporatist organisation stemming from the 
state, not the unions, and suggests trade union leaders at the head of unwieldy empires 
were often subject to the over-ambitious demands of successive governments. Similarly 
in relation to the Labour Party-trade union link, Lewis Minkin has suggested that, while 
substantial, trade union power, through a complex set of movement ‘rules’ and 
arrangements, was significantly constrained. Ben Jackson further argues that British trade 
unionism in the 1970s faced the increasingly powerful and hostile ideological counter-
attack of neo-liberal and free market critiques – of the ‘legal immunities’ and ‘special 
privileges’ enjoyed by organised labour and the (adverse) economic role played by trade 
unions in the ‘existence of a potent form of free collective bargaining in the British 
economy’ – which looked to ‘crystallise the pathologies of British corporatism and to 
‘deligitimise’ the status and power of trade unions.6 
 
These expert judgements certainly hold merit in the context of wider debates over 
the trade union position and role, but what is important here is that new revisionist 
perceptions of apparently ‘unrestricted’ trade unionism was a primary aspect of a wider 
on-going critique of traditional social democracy, notably its unreconstructed 
commitment to high levels of public spending and greater economic equality, which pre-
figured the later party split and division of social democracy (and, arguably, the eventual 
                                                 
6 Robert Taylor, The Trade Union Question in British Politics: Government and the Unions Since 1945 
(Oxford, 1993); Ben Jackson, ‘An ideology of class: Neo-liberalism and the trade unions, c. 1930-79’, in 
Clare Griffiths, James Nott and William Whyte (eds), Classes, Cultures and Politics: Essays for Ross 
McKibbin (Oxford, 2011), 263-81; ‘Hayek, Hutt and the Trade Unions’, in Robert Leeson (ed.), Hayek: A 
Collaborative Biography, Part V (Basingstoke, 2014), 208-28.    
 6 
emergence of ‘New’ Labour).7 The essential argument here is that central to this critique 
and a principal cause of the split in the Labour Party, the schism of British social 
democracy and the formation of the SDP in 1981 was the breakdown of consensus in the 
party over the privileged position and role of trade unionism and the issue of trade union 
reform itself. It contends that growing rifts over core tenets of the post-war social 
democratic consensus, not only between left and right and the party and trade unions but 
within Labour’s previously cohesive and influential revisionist social democracy, forged 
the circumstances in which party unity inevitably broke down. 
 
The article develops this argument by examining the differential responses of the 
‘radical’ social democratic Labour right to three inter-linked case studies of key episodes 
of trade union reform and tests of the Labour party-trade union link between 1969 and 
1975: firstly, the Wilson Labour government’s abortive attempt to reform the trade 
unions in In Place of Strife in 1969; secondly, the Heath Conservative government’s 
subsequent 1971 Industrial Relations Act and, thirdly, the evolution of Labour’s ‘social 
contract’ with the trade unions of 1974-5. It further comments on associated 
developments of an emerging fissure and re-ordering of ‘first principles’ of ‘equality’ and 
                                                 
7 The economic consequences of ‘unrestricted’ trade union power and collectivism, particularly its 
contribution to low growth and high inflation, underpinned a broader critique of trade unionism and 
industrial relations in the context of a growing perception and analysis of relative British (economic) 
‘decline’. For some, the assertive power and priorities of trade unionism in the 1970s acted as a major 
obstacle to industrial modernisation and national economic development: National Library of Scotland 
(NLS), Edinburgh,  John P. Mackintosh Papers, 323/8, John P. Mackintosh, ‘Britain’s malaise: political or 
economic?’, typescript of the 1977 Fawley Lecture, University of Southampton, 23 November 1977; 
Labour History Archive and Study Centre (LHASC), Manchester, Labour Party Manifesto Group Papers, 
LP/MANIF/18, Manifesto Group, What We Must Do: A Democratic Socialist Approach to Britain’s Crisis 
(London, 1977); Meredith, ‘Labour Party’, 254, 268; Minkin, Contentious, 209–10. 
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‘freedom’ within revisionist social democracy in the face of the perceived  
‘undemocratic’ and ‘illiberal’ aspects of extended trade union power. These will be used 
to identify attitudes and responses to the thorny issue of the ‘trade union question’ in 
British and Labour politics in the 1970s, and to reveal the scale and depth of their 
disenchantment with the trade union-dominated Labour Party, of the increasingly 
cohesive faction of ‘radical’ ‘post-revisionist’ social democrats known as the 
‘Jenkinsites’ (with reference to their ostensible leader, Roy Jenkins). Consequently, it 
was the issue of unreformed and collectivist trade union power in the party and the 
country that was to be the principal cause of the fracture of British social democracy and 
the Labour Party after Labour’s election defeat in 1979. 
 
Crosland, Labour revisionism and the crisis of social democracy 
 
Given his seminal contribution to the original revisionist social democratic paradigm, the 
role and ideas of Anthony Crosland provided an essential reference point for successive 
generations of Labour revisionists. Crosland’s ‘revisionism’ achieved a degree of 
consensus on the centre-right of the Labour Party from the 1950s under the political 
leadership of Hugh Gaitskell. Giles Radice has written that Crosland’s thinking 
‘influenced a whole generation’. This sentiment is echoed by others such as David 
Marquand, Bill Rodgers and David Owen, who were to form the spine of Labour’s post-
revisionist response to the limitations of his original analysis in the 1970s.8 Crosland 
                                                 
8 Giles Radice, ‘Revisionism revisited’, Socialist Commentary, May 1974, 25; David Marquand, Interview, 
16 January 2001; Bill Rodgers, Interview, 18 February 2001; Owen, Time, 167; also see Roy Hattersley, 
 8 
argued that to define socialism purely in terms of ownership was to confuse ends and 
means. Public ownership was only one, and not necessarily the most effective, means 
among many, including taxation, public/social expenditure and educational reform, which 
could be used to achieve fundamental socialist objectives. For Crosland, socialism was 
about ‘equality’ in its widest sense, requiring major ‘egalitarian changes in our 
educational system, the distribution of property, the distribution of resources in terms of 
need, social manners and style of life and the location of power in industry’. He believed 
that the pursuit of these revised socialist objectives could be better achieved through the 
means of progressive taxation and high levels of public expenditure within the context of 
consistent economic growth rather than dogmatic doses of public ownership.9 Crosland’s 
revisionism represented a detailed theoretical analysis of socialism as equality, and a 
clear programme around which Labour social democracy could cohere.10 
 
By the early 1970s there was increasing discomfort among some former disciples 
that his earlier revisionist analysis and prescriptions had not kept pace with the limited 
performance of the British economy. The perception was that he failed to substantially 
readdress these structural limitations or to adapt his analysis to the twin dilemmas of low 
economic growth and persistent inflation. Crosland’s final substantive work largely 
                                                                                                                                                 
Choose Freedom: The Future for Democratic Socialism (London, 1987), xix; David Marquand, The 
Progressive Dilemma: From Lloyd George to Blair (London, 1999), 166-7.   
9 Anthony Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London, 1956); also see Anthony Crosland, The 
Conservative Enemy: a Program of Radical Reform for the 1960s (London, 1962); Anthony Crosland, ‘The 
transition from capitalism’, in Richard Crossman (ed.), New Fabian Essays (London, 1952), 33-68. 
10 Radice, ‘Revisionism’, 26. 
 9 
reiterated the theory, priorities and methods of his original analysis.11 Crosland’s 
revisionist social democracy was founded on an optimistic view of economic growth to 
underpin a sustained programme of social expenditure and egalitarian redistribution. John 
Mackintosh, arguably the most likely of Labour’s ‘post-revisionists’ to offer a systematic 
critique and renewal of Croslandite revisionism for the circumstances of the 1970s had he 
not died prematurely in 1978, claimed that he had realised by 1976 that ‘something had 
gone wrong with…[Croslandite] assumptions…which I had held at the time of my 
election in 1966’. He believed that subsequent economic developments had revealed ‘the 
relative failure of his position’ and that ‘further revisions are now needed’. 
 
It was a view indicative of a wider critique of Crosland’s original theoretical 
position, not just from the ‘Marxist’ left, but  from revisionist social democrats such as 
Mackintosh and Marquand ‘who accepted many of Tony’s original assumptions’.12 
Mackintosh revealed a more pessimistic post-revisionist ‘declinist’ analysis of British 
economic performance, in which low economic growth and inflationary pressures were 
much greater problems than the previously optimistic revisionist narrative had 
                                                 
11 Anthony Crosland, Socialism Now and Other Essays (London, 1974), 17-48; Anthony Crosland, A Social 
Democratic Britain (London, 1971); also see Kevin Jefferys, ‘The old right’, in Raymond Plant, Matt 
Beech and Kevin Hickson (eds), The Struggle for Labour’s Soul: Understanding Labour’s Political 
Thought Since 1945 (London, 2004), 77-8; Giles Radice, ‘What about the workers?’, Socialist 
Commentary, February 1971, 6-7; Radice, ‘Revisionism’, 26.  
12 Mackintosh Papers, 323/54, John Mackintosh to Mrs Audrey Coppard, The Political Quarterly, 19 May 
1977; Mackintosh to David Marquand, 25 May 1977; Mackintosh to Bernard Crick, 27 May 1977; 
Marquand to Mackintosh, 15 June 1977; also see John P. Mackintosh, ‘Has social democracy failed in 
Britain’, Political Quarterly, 49, 3 (1978), 259-70. 
 10 
predicted.13 In the context of an economic ‘malaise’ of minimal growth, high inflation 
and pervasive trade union activity, and in the face of a nascent post-revisionist economic 
and increasingly philosophical critique of Croslandite social democracy, Jefferys has 
claimed that by Labour’s return to office in 1974 ‘Crosland had become almost a one-
man champion of egalitarian’ social democracy.14  
 
Central to the new post-revisionist analysis was the perspective that high levels of 
taxation and public expenditure in conditions of low growth, allied to the perceived 
economic and libertarian dangers of unrestricted trade union power and collectivism, 
would inevitably undermine individual freedoms and the opportunities and benefits of 
wealth creation that would underpin economic growth.15 It was a position increasingly 
identified with an explicitly ‘social democrat’ or ‘left-wing liberal’ element of 
revisionism, whose particular outlook went ‘beyond the central issue of wages and 
equality’. As they ‘are interested in individual rights and social justice, they will accept 
liberal legislation…when much of this is alien to working-class group feeling which 
thinks of liberty more in terms of what groups can do and of what status they have in 
society’.16 As such, they believed that Crosland’s ‘reformist, egalitarian approach’ had 
been ‘discredited by the experience of the 1963-77 period’, and there was the need to 
                                                 
13 Mackintosh, ‘Britain’s malaise’, 1. 
14 Jefferys, ‘old right’, 77.   
15 Mackintosh Papers, 323/117, notes headed ‘Finance Bill’ with attached list of major wage claims and 
settlements, 7 April–7 May 1975; John P. Mackintosh, ‘Liberty and equality: getting the balance right’, in 
David Marquand (ed.), John P. Mackintosh on Parliament and Social Democracy (Harlow, 1982), 182-89.      
16 See John Gyford and Stephen Haseler, Social Democracy: Beyond Revisionism (London, 1971); John P. 
Mackintosh, ‘Socialism’, 470-5; Mackintosh, ‘Britain’s malaise’, 1-3; Mackintosh, ‘Has social democracy’, 
259-63, 66-70. 
 11 
further revise and modernise the Croslandite revisionism fostered under Gaitskell. In 
doing so, they appeared willing to confront ‘sacred cows’ of Labour’s economic and 
industrial philosophy. 
 
Labour’s industrial relations dilemma: In Place of Strife? 
 
The Labour government’s White Paper of January 1969, ‘In Place of Strife: A Policy for 
Industrial Relations’, was Labour’s attempt to reform trade union status and power by 
confining industrial relations ‘within a framework of law’. It was part of a wider desire to 
‘modernise Britain’s institutions’ and to ‘humanise the whole administration of the state’, 
not least as a solution to the country’s recurrent economic difficulties after Labour 
returned to power in 1964 (Labour Party, 1964; Ponting, 1990).17 However, extensive 
opposition to the bill within the party and the trade unions represented a serious threat to 
the unity of the party and to the struggling Labour government itself. Many in the 
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), ‘viscerally opposed to penal sanctions on trade 
unions’, feared that the continued dispute between the Labour government and the Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) could only end in electoral disaster.18 
 
                                                 
17 Labour Party, The New Britain (London, 1964); Clive Ponting, Breach of Promise: Labour in Power 
1964-1970 (Harmondsworth, 1990), 257, 350-51. 
18 LHASC, LP/PLP Minutes, 29 January 1969; also Leo Abse, Interview, 20 June 2001; Roy Hattersley, 
Who Goes Home? Scenes from a Political Life (London, 1995), 67-9; Denis Healey, Time of My Life 
(Harmondsworth, 1989), 341, 407; Ponting, Breach, 351; Giles Radice, Friends & Rivals: Crosland, 
Jenkins and Healey (London, 2002), 172-3; Richard Tyler, ‘“Victims of our history”? Barbara Castle and 
In Place of Strife’, Contemporary British History, 20, 3 (2006), 462. 
 12 
Increasing strain in the relationship between the government and the trade unions 
over wage restraint and the generally poor state of British industrial relations, particularly 
the debilitative level of unofficial strikes and economically detrimental ‘restrictive 
practices’, had led to the creation of a Royal Commission on Trade Union and 
Employers’ Associations under the chairmanship of Lord Donovan. Harold Wilson had 
‘decided on union reform because he had given up hope of making incomes policy 
work’.19 The final report of the Donovan Commission in 1968 rejected any idea of a legal 
framework or state intervention in industrial relations. It recommended purely voluntary 
reform on the shop floor through improved collective bargaining. The only move towards 
intervention was the proposal to establish a Commission for Industrial Relations (CIR), 
which would ultimately be a ‘voluntary body to prod the system into self-reform by 
disseminating ideas about good practice’.20 The voluntarist features of the Donovan 
Report were welcomed by some leading figures in the Labour government, such as 
Callaghan. However, Barbara Castle, the newly appointed Secretary of State for 
Employment and Productivity, believed that the Donovan recommendations represented a 
missed opportunity.21 The central issue was whether Donovan was adequate, given the 
increasing number of unofficial strikes in key industries and the inflationary pressures of 
the British economy. It was decided that something more substantial was necessary in the 
form of a legal framework for trade unions to supplement government prices and incomes 
policy. The opportunity to outflank the Tories on the issue and a forthcoming general 
                                                 
19 Healey, Time, 341; Giles Radice, The Industrial Democrats: Trade Unions in an Uncertain World 
(London, 1978), 67; Radice, Friends, 175. 
20 Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan: A Life (Oxford, 1997), 330-1; Ponting, Breach, 351-2. 
21 Barbara Castle, Fighting All The Way (London, 1994), 413-14. 
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election meant that Wilson offered Castle enthusiastic support in her attempt to reform 
the context of industrial relations.22 
 
The draft White Paper, published at the end of 1968, adopted some of the 
Donovan themes, but also included proposals for pre-strike ballots in disputes that could 
threaten the economy or national interest, an enforced conciliation period of twenty-eight 
days in unofficial disputes and referral of unofficial action arising from inter-union 
disputes to the TUC, and ultimately the CIR, to impose a settlement, with appropriate 
financial penalties if the order was breached. The White Paper was presented as a ‘charter 
for tackling the causes of strikes [and]…to tackle these causes in ways which will 
strengthen the trade union movement’s authority’. Rather than advocating greater 
ministerial intervention in disputes, it wanted ‘unions themselves to face up to their 
responsibilities in preventing unnecessary disputes which can do wanton damage to other 
members of the community’. Proposals for a ‘conciliation pause’ aimed to ‘ensure that 
workers do not down tools before they have used the procedure for examining disputes 
which their own union have negotiated’.23 
 
In the hostile Labour and trade union response to Barbara Castle’s proposals, and 
the subsequent divisions of the Labour Cabinet and PLP, their relatively balanced nature 
                                                 
22 Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-70 (London, 1984), 625; Morgan, Callaghan, 331-2; Ben 
Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London, 1992), 528; Ponting, Breach, 354. 
23 Cmnd. 3888, In Place of Strife: A Policy for Industrial Relations, (London, 1969); LP/PLP Minutes, ‘The 
Prime Minister’s Speech to the Parliamentary Labour Party’, 17 April 1969; The National Archives: Public 
Record Office (TNA: PRO), Kew, Cabinet Minutes and Papers, CAB 129/142/9, ‘Industrial Relations Bill, 
Memorandum by the First Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity’, 20 May 1969; Morgan, 
Callaghan, 332; Ponting, Breach, 352-54; Tribune, 7 February 1969. 
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was overlooked, containing as they did a number of pro-trade union measures in ‘a 
charter of trade union rights’. It was ‘grounded in a well-thought-out philosophy of trade 
union rights and responsibilities’ and designed to ‘protect and enhance the standing of the 
trade union movement’.24 In addition to the ‘punitive’ paragraphs, it contained proposals 
for the recognition of trade unions and trade union rights in the workplace, the creation of 
a development fund, with government support, to encourage and assist in union mergers 
and measures to combat unfair dismissal by employers. It further rejected ideas that 
collective bargaining should be legally enforceable and unofficial strikers could be sued 
for any damages that they incurred.25 It was the penal aspects of the bill, providing the 
government with increased powers to limit the scope of trade union and industrial action, 
which were quickly latched on to and led to intense resentment in the trade union 
movement and within the party. The catalyst for hostility was the view that for ‘the first 
time since 1927, a government – a Labour government – was proposing to interpose the 
force of the law into hitherto unfettered collective bargaining’.26 
 
However, for a number of Labour’s ‘radical’ revisionist social democrats, who 
favoured some significant reduction of trade union status and power both within the party 
and wider political and economic arenas of the country, the hostility and intransigence of 
the trade unions, supported by the bitter opposition of Labour’s left-wing and traditional 
centrist social democrats led by James Callaghan, ‘came close to challenging the 
                                                 
24 LP/PLP Minutes, 29 January 1969; Tyler, ‘“Victims”’, 461-62. 
25 Cmnd. 3888, 9-12, 18-21, 22-4; Peter Jenkins, The Battle of Downing Street (London, 1970), 26-43. 
26 Jenkins, Battle, 44-74; Minkin, Contentious, 114-15; Morgan, Callaghan, 333. 
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government’s right to govern’ and to ‘represent the interests of the wider community’.27 
Their increasing isolation and marginalisation both within the party and from erstwhile 
revisionist social democratic colleagues in earlier intra-party divisions, with the further 
thorny and divisive party issue of British membership of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) still to come, had already been established and battle lines had been 
drawn. 
 
Although it was not a so-called ‘article of faith’ for the group of ‘radical’ 
revisionist social democrats around Roy Jenkins in the way the European membership 
question was to be described, one prominent member of the group, Dick Taverne, 
explained that the later split with his local constituency Labour party (CLP) in Lincoln 
had ‘as much to do with the attitude to the unions as it did with the Common Market’. He 
explains that ‘I was in favour…and they were violently opposed to In Place of Strife. The 
belief was that the unions needed reform and the arguments of the Labour government’s 
legislation were correct. It was an important issue…that and the [left-wing Tony Benn] 
plan for massive nationalisation…the anti-[Common]Market theme all combined…to 
say…the Labour Party is going in a direction that I will not support’.28 Some within the 
group even believed that, in the longer term, it might have ‘saved the unions from 
themselves’ and would not have helped to ‘destroy the subsequent [1974-79] Labour 
government of… Callaghan and…the Labour Party’. A further prominent ‘radical’ social 
                                                 
27 Tribune, 24 January 1969; Tyler, ‘“Victims”’, 461, 474; also see Ponting, Breach, 354; Radice, Friends, 
173-74. 
28 Dick Taverne, Interview, 18 January 2001; Dick Taverne, The Future of the Left: Lincoln and After 
(London, 1974), 42-43 
 16 
democrat in favour of reform, Shirley Williams, has said that Labour and trade union 
opposition to its own government’s industrial relations legislation managed only to 
produce the ‘situation in which Mrs Thatcher was able to come in on the back of trade 
union abuses in the 1970s and essentially get rid of much trade union power, and that 
there was an awful lot of support for her among the public and some in the Labour 
movement who had not had the guts to do what she did’.29 Arguably, it might also have 
worked to prevent the subsequent rupture of British social democracy and formal split in 
the Labour Party after 1979 which led, indirectly at least, to eighteen years out of 
government until the election of Tony Blair’s much reformed ‘New’ Labour Party in 
1997. 
 
More immediately, it produced the effect of unlocking emerging ideological and 
political fissures of post-war Labour revisionist social democracy, which later intensified 
in the divisive European membership issue in opposition after 1970.30 Prior to the 
catalytic European membership debates and divisions in the party, differential responses 
to the Labour government’s attempt at industrial relations and trade union reform in In 
Place of Strife signalled the shift away from post-war revisionist social democracy of 
some of its former leading advocates such as Anthony Crosland.31 Equally, it indicated 
                                                 
29 Shirley Williams, Interview, 25 June 2002; also Bill Rodgers, Interview; Phillip Whitehead, Interview, 
20 January 2001. 
30 Meredith, 'catalyst’. 
31 Former leading revisionist figures now appeared to be at loggerheads over a critical theme of party 
management and governing strategy. Crosland, for instance, was sceptical of the timing of the proposed 
reform. He was also concerned that the proposed penal clauses would be ineffective and unofficial strikes 
would continue to grow, proposing instead the Donovan recommendation that the CIR be awarded powers 
in relation to unofficial strikes : British Library of Political and Economic Science (BLPES), London, 
 17 
the emergence of a new identifiable strand and group of ‘radical’ post-revisionist social 
democrats under the new revisionist leadership of Roy Jenkins, many of whom would 
form the breakaway group to leave the Labour Party to establish the new SDP in 1981. In 
a similar manner to later European Common Market debates and divisions, In Place of 
Strife divided revisionist social democracy within itself and revealed something of its 
underlying tensions and emerging intellectual, political and organisational fragmentation. 
 
‘Undemocratic and unconstitutional’? Opposition to the Conservative government’s 
Industrial Relations Act 
 
Following Labour’s subsequent election defeat in 1970, partly as a result of the failure 
and divisions of its own industrial relations legislation in 1969, reform of industrial 
relations was left to the incoming Conservative government of Edward Heath, although 
the privileged position of the trade unions in both the party and wider political economy 
remained a critical aspect of Labour’s own internal debate and of the new revisionist 
social democratic critique of the Labour Party and traditional social democracy.32  The 
new attempt to regulate trade union activity came in the form of the Heath government’s 
1971 Industrial Relations Act.  
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32 Giles Radice, ‘Trade unions and the Labour Party’, Socialist Commentary, November 1970, 7-10 
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The substance of the new legislation again offered trade unions a combination of 
benefits and restrictions, but sought to introduce legal controls of industrial relations by 
the compulsory 'registration' of trade unions and the regulation of union-employer 
agreements, enforceable by fines or imprisonment. It included both the right to belong to 
a trade union and the right not to, a development ‘which struck at the heart of the pre-
entry closed shop which many unions had established’. Trade unions won the right of 
recognition and improved protection against unfair dismissal, but these had to be pursued 
as ‘registered’ unions through the new National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) and 
the CIR. Unregistered unions lost tax concessions and were left open to unlimited claims 
for damages if they were accused of the ‘unfair industrial practices’ established in the 
bill.33  
 
Inevitably, the much more complex and extensive proposals again aroused great 
trade union and Labour Party hostility. Trade union leaders felt they struck at the very 
heart of the gains and immunities won over seventy years of industrial struggle. The 
benefits were negligible and ‘clamped in corporatist embrace and legal restraint’. The 
concept of registration particularly, in exchange for benefits or favours and in preference 
to penalties, was bitterly opposed by trade unions and interpreted as ‘state-licence’. The 
TUC organised a ‘Kill the Bill’ demonstration in February 1971 and at a special 
conference the following month advised member unions to de-register.34 The Labour 
Party was also very largely hostile to the legislation. Much of the dense, ‘complex 
                                                 
33 Phillip Whitehead, The Writing on the Wall: Britain in the Seventies (London, 1985), 70-1.  
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package’ of legislation was forced through the guillotine procedure in the House of 
Commons without debate. On one parliamentary occasion, the Labour opposition, 
incongruously led by Barbara Castle herself, voted solidly through twenty four divisions 
against a mass of clauses contained in the bill that there had been no time to discuss. 
 
Some pro-reform revisionist social democrats were highly critical of Labour’s 
obstructive tactics in opposition to the bill, particularly given that it reflected and 
‘partially implemented…Labour’s own In Place of Strife’.35 Nevertheless, the Industrial 
Relations Act was duly passed to a cacophony of Labour and trade union opposition to 
the new legal framework. Against a background of repetitive crisis and states of 
emergency, the industrial sector witnessed an intensive period of unrest and conflict from 
the autumn of 1971 that ultimately undermined and discredited important elements of the 
Conservative legislation, and it was repealed on Labour’s return to office in 1974.36 
 
As well as the inevitable opposition of the trade unions and the Labour left, it was 
particularly frustrating for ‘radical’ revisionist social democrats in the Labour Party who 
felt able to support notions of a new legal framework for trade union activity to see 
traditional centre-right figures such as Callaghan and even former revisionist social 
democrats such as Crosland, either explicitly or implicitly, resistant to all initiatives in 
this respect. Callaghan appeared to be moving further to the political left on industrial 
                                                 
35 William Rodgers, Fourth Among Equals (London, 2000), 121; also see Hattersley, Who, 96-8; Dick 
Leonard, Interview, 23 January 2001; Marquand, Progressive, 195-6; Rodgers, Interview. 
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relations and trade union matters (as well as Europe) to meet the ‘powerful new forces of 
industrial, political and generational revolt’, and it was perhaps ‘remarkable to see a 
former British Home Secretary defending the right of workers to resist the operation of 
‘bad laws’ constitutionally passed through parliament’. Some even speculated that 
Callaghan was realigning himself with the new grass-roots radicalism to extend his lines 
of support within the wider Labour movement to promote a future leadership bid.37 In 
truth, he was long perceived to belong to a ‘generation of Labour leaders which had come 
to depend on the trade union block vote for protection against extremism in the 
constituencies’, and the ‘trade unions had provided his main political base in the previous 
decade’, although now taking on new extreme form and features.38 
 
Once again, the Conservative version of trade union reform revealed an emerging 
political schism (beyond the single European membership issue) within Labour’s 
previously influential post-war revisionist social democracy. Previously influential 
revisionist figures such as Crosland again appeared to adopt something of the standard 
party line on the issue, increasingly at odds with the new post-revisionist approach to the 
party-union link and the conduct of industrial relations and regulation of trade union 
activity of the new ‘radical’ revisionist social democrats. While the former acknowledged 
some of the excesses and hazards of unrestricted trade union power, they also recognised 
the party and movement problems implicit in any attempt to reform the context of 
industrial relations. Like Callaghan, Crosland viewed the trade unions as representative 
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of Labour’s wider political culture and working-class credentials and again as an 
effective safeguard against amplified left-wing influence in the constituencies. 
 
Many of the latter lacked the same ‘cultural’ hostility to the notion of trade union 
reform, and emphasised the intrinsic similarity of the Conservative Industrial Relations 
Act to Labour’s own In Place of Strife proposals. Their nominal leader, Roy Jenkins, 
pointed to Labour’s ‘irrational’ and ‘appalling ass’ response in its ‘frienzied’ opposition 
to ‘the Conservative government’s Industrial Relations Bill as a monstrous piece of class 
oppression, despite the fact that it owed about 80 per cent of its inspiration to…In Place 
of Strife’.39 John Mackintosh suggested that ‘[w]hilst the spirit of the document is 
fundamentally different from that of the Labour Government’s White Paper…it contains 
a number of important recommendations which to a large extent coincide with or 
resemble those of the Labour Government (e.g. on a Code of Industrial Practice, on 
information to be supplied by the employer, to some extent on protection against unfair 
dismissal, and on recognition). It would be a mistake to reject it in toto. It should be 
fought on the essential points to which objections must be raised’.40 Consequently, they 
argued a ‘constitutional’ line for their own lack of opposition to the Conservative 
legislation. Their general position was that ‘Mr. Heath’s…legislation on industrial 
relations seem[ed] to be just as sensible as the Bill which Mr. Wilson…proposed’. It was 
required if only to ‘bring some discipline into the apparent chaos of trade unionism’. 
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Increasingly for ‘radical’ revisionist social democrats, perceived domination of Labour 
by the trade unions meant that one of the party’s initial assets was turning into a 
‘liability’, and the restrictive practices associated with trade unionism were acting as a 
serious barrier to Labour’s position as a party of government and of progress and 
reform.41 
 
From this perspective, the increasingly enhanced and vocal role and influence of 
the trade union movement in both the Labour Party and the conduct of government 
industrial and economic policy represented a fundamental test of the democratic process 
itself. In the face of Labour’s own failed attempt to reform the context and conduct of 
industrial relations, and against the background of intense opposition and hostility within 
the party and wider labour movement to subsequent Conservative trade union reform 
legislation, the Labour Party and revisionist social democracy remained divided on the 
‘trade union question’ in British politics in the new radicalised industrial and political 
environment of the early 1970s. For ‘radical’ post-revisionist social democrats in the 
party sympathetic to the need for industrial and economic modernisation through reform, 
and eager to resolve the dangerous tension they foresaw between the extreme 
collectivism and pursuit of sectional interests in the enhanced trade union role in the party 
and society and questions of individual liberty and freedom, it was becoming apparent 
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that the Labour Party may no longer be an appropriate social democratic vehicle by 
which to pursue these means.  
 
Labour government, the ‘social contract’ and ‘government by trade union’? 
 
The period of Labour government from February 1974 worked only to harden respective 
views and positions on the ‘trade union question’. It witnessed ‘a high point of trade 
union influence’ in an enhanced role for the trade unions through the prior establishment 
of the Labour Party-TUC ‘social contract’, agreed with the trade unions while in 
opposition to improve the sense of party and movement unity and electoral credibility 
and to provide a feasible wages agreement to help control high inflation and achieve 
sustained growth in the standard of living.42 Originating in the new Labour Party-TUC 
Liaison Committee in 1971, the arrangement represented the internal settlement of the 
Labour alliance of party and trade unions after the divisions and rupture caused by the In 
Place of Strife conflict in 1969. Both parties agreed to adopt ‘a wide-ranging agreement’ 
over inflation and the cost of living involving wage restraint under a Labour government. 
In exchange, the Labour government would pursue economic and social policies 
congenial to the trade unions and their members in terms of conciliation and arbitration 
procedures in industrial disputes, redistribution of wealth and progressive social policies 
such as higher pensions.  
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However, the specific industrial and economic arrangements of the Labour 
government in the ‘social contract’ reinforced misgivings about the industrial role of 
trade unions and about trade union political leverage through the Labour Party for those 
most concerned with the dangers of trade union collectivism and sectional interests. 
Moreover, the ‘social contract’ appeared to be incapable of dealing with escalating wage 
claims and spiralling inflation. For a short period between 1975 and 1978, the TUC’s co-
operation brought a degree of control but the accommodation was always predicated, on 
the trade union side, on the assumption of a return to free collective bargaining, but this 
assumption was not shared by some Labour government ministers and Members of 
Parliament (MPs), for whom it now represented a dated perspective inconsistent with the 
pursuit of policies conducive to the prosperity of the economy.43 For ‘radical’ revisionist 
social democrats increasingly estranged from the restrictive ‘values and “rules” of the 
Labour movement’, the Labour-TUC ‘social contract’ represented a somewhat uneven 
agreement. While a prospective Labour government detailed its future programme, and in 
a way that arguably compromised its role as voice for the whole nation, the trade union 
side of the bargain was more ambiguous. It was viewed as a one-sided arrangement, by 
which the government fulfilled its obligations under the ‘social contract’ while the unions 
did little or nothing to respond’, and as an agreement that should be taken to imply that 
the unions must never be criticised.44 There was no mention of incomes policy, no 
reference to productivity, industrial efficiency or economic modernisation and little 
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attention to the generation rather than redistribution of wealth, all of which were 
becoming central themes of new post-revisionist social democratic political economy.45 
 
On this reading, the ‘social contract’ represented a major disaster of the enhanced 
relationship of the trade unions with the Labour government after 1974. Its origins 
reflected Labour’s perceived failure over the economy and industrial relations while in 
government between 1964-70, and it committed a Labour government coming to power  
in 1974 to a ‘horrific manifesto which there was no chance at all of delivering in those 
circumstances’. The degree of ‘radical’ revisionist social democratic disenchantment with 
their party was evident in the belief of some that ‘Labour did not deserve to win in 1974’, 
given its ‘behaviour on Europe and the inflationary social contract it had agreed with the 
trade unions’, with the ‘party’s institutional links with the unions’ clearly at its root.46 In 
addition to shifting politically leftwards in opposition as a result of increased left-wing 
influence and activity in the constituencies and other organs of the party, it was now 
believed that Labour had become far too dependent on the trade unions. It was inevitable 
that Labour would be committed to repealing the Conservative Industrial Relations Act, 
although it owed many of its clauses to Labour’s own failed In Place of Strife legislation. 
Moreover, the ‘new’ settlement with the unions extended well beyond the industrial 
sphere. A joint declaration of aims published in February 1973 included a wide-ranging 
system of price controls, big increases in public and social spending on pensions, health, 
housing and transport and substantial extensions of left-wing policies of public 
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ownership. The so-called ‘great compact’ of the ‘social contract’ between a future Labour 
government and the trade unions appeared to be a deal very largely on the unions’ terms. 
Labour was promising to deliver on a whole range of costly social expenditure; the 
unions merely agreed to take these commitments into account when bargaining for their 
members.47 
 
It was in the context of the conflict and collapse of Heath’s Conservative 
industrial relations policy during 1973 to 1974, the three-day week and the national 
miners’ strike that the ‘social contract’ with the trade unions appeared as ‘a better way’ 
and ‘Labour’s only strategic option if it hoped to win the next election’, but for post-
revisionist social democrats there was the distinct belief that ‘we had handed the 
economy over to the unions’, only adding pressure to public spending expectations and 
commitments in a highly unstable economic environment.48 The uncomfortable and 
irrevocable truth for ‘radical’ revisionists looking to ‘modernise’ and ‘democratise’ 
Labour’s platform and commitments was now the belief that its leaders were in thrall to 
or fearful of ‘a number of dangerous beasts’ living further up the mountain who, in their 
new intimate relationship with an elected Labour government, were effectively governing 
the country; the bigger of these ‘were known as union leaders’.49  
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A ‘brooding oppressive shadow’? Trade union collectivism, sectional interests and 
questions of ‘freedom’ 
 
Underlying the intensification of the ‘trade union question’ in the politics of the 1970s 
was increasing awareness of the tension between core concepts of ‘freedom’ and 
‘equality’ in (post-) revisionist social democratic thought and practice. Amplification of 
the concept of personal freedom across a range of policy spheres had been a key tenet of 
Gaitskellite revisionism in the 1950s, which ‘turned into one of the few clear success 
stories of the 1964-70 Labour Government’.50 This conceptual dilemma was magnified 
for Labour’s new factional social democrats in the 1970s as they reflected on ‘the 
electoral liabilities of varying labour institutions’. A ‘new and introspective awareness 
grew on the Right of the Labour Party of the trade-off between equality and liberty – a 
trade-off the older revisionist leaders, “children of the successes of war-time 
collectivism”, had not fully appreciated’, and if ‘a choice had to be made between 
freedom and equality, then…[new] revisionists would plump for freedom’.51 
 
Borrowing Michael Freeden’s terminology, responses to the dilemmas of the 
‘trade union question’ exhibited something of the internal conceptual morphology and 
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conceptual evolution of revisionist social democracy.52 It signalled the willingness of 
post-revisionist social democrats to undertake to reorder ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ concepts 
as a process of its own internal ideological ‘conceptual competition’. Positive tension 
induced by the inter-relationship and mutually-reinforcing nature of concepts of 
‘equality’ and ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’ was a recurring feature of revisionist social 
democratic thought developed through the work of Tawney, Crosland and others. Social 
democrats such as Roy Hattersley expressed a fundamental belief in the egalitarian 
foundations of a ‘positive’ conception of freedom. He was committed to the ethical 
framework provided by Tony Crosland: that socialism ‘is about the pursuit of equality 
and the protection of freedom – in the knowledge that until we are truly equal we will not 
be truly free’ and that ‘the good society is the equal society’.53 Influenced by Tawney, 
Crosland and, to an extent, John Rawls, his position involved absolute loyalty to the idea 
and ‘first political obligation’ of ‘creating a more equal society’.54  
 
In contrast, a keener sense or perception of the limits and potential dangers to ‘liberty’ or 
‘freedom’ of unfettered egalitarian principles manifested in unconstrained trade union 
collectivism or the impulsive redistribution of material wealth based on punitive taxation 
and high levels of public expenditure is apparent in the ‘exit’ texts of those who founded 
the SDP. A common theme in this writing is that the interpretation of socialism as just 
‘equality’ and equality only in terms of, for instance, distribution, reflects a narrow 
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definition that underplays the ‘predisposition for liberty’ of ‘any thinking democrat’. The 
relentless pursuit of equality through distribution might be used as ‘justification for 
abandoning liberty…to be sure of achieving equality’.55 Potentially owing more to Evan 
Durbin than Crosland, whom some post-revisionist social democrats considered to be 
‘courageous and clear-headed…about the meaning of freedom’, they claimed that 
individuals now desired more control of their own lives. This demanded greater attention 
to notions of individual freedom than hitherto in social democratic theory. Accordingly, 
the Labour Party should recognise that most individuals now placed personal 
consumption and individual freedoms above the pursuit of equality. It was a perspective 
that increasingly ‘lacked any sense of Crosland’s commitment to equality as the central 
feature of Labour’s vision of the future’.56 
 
A growing concern of post-revisionist social democrats, not always shared by more 
pragmatic centre-right colleagues, was the belief that, because of an ‘overly intimate 
relationship with the trade unions, the government was moving in illiberal directions that 
were potentially dangerous to the principles of democratic government’.57 Protracted 
controversy over issues emerging out of Michael Foot’s new expanded ‘closed shop’ 
legislation and highly publicised cases of ‘closed shop victimisation’, such as that of the 
National Union of Journalists, also revealed antagonisms among ‘radical’ post-revisionist 
social democrats, who increasingly deemed the protection of liberal freedoms as the first 
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priority.58 Additionally, wider right-wing attacks on the trade union closed shop and 
collectivist values as a danger to personal liberty ‘found an anxious sensitivity on 
Labour’s Right’, as it was acknowledged that the question of freedom was now high on 
the political agenda in Britain and across Europe ‘with the ethical credentials of 
Socialism under scrutiny’. Although it remained ‘unproven that the Labour Party will be 
incapable of redressing the balance between collectivism and individualism’, that it 
‘required redressing was not in doubt’. For some, the next political priority ‘should be to 
reassert the value of the freedom of the individual’.59 
 
The first of these two interrelated concerns, the ‘undemocratic and unconstitutional’ 
dimensions of trade union power, particularly over a democratically elected government, 
remained a rallying call to the evolution of post-revisionist social democracy. Shirley 
Williams has explained that she: 
 
did not think the trade unions any more than…the CBI had any right to be 
part of a committee which determines the legislative programmes of 
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government…it is dangerous and corrupting. By late Wilson, ’75-’76, the 
trade unions were actually calling the shots to a great extent in terms of what 
legislation they would accept and what they wouldn’t…What they wouldn’t 
accept was treated as [a]…veto, and…this was a very dangerous road to 
go…The central issue of the constitutional responsibility of the executive to 
parliament and not to any other body is…a very central principle…So the old 
trade union right did not see the point of people like…me who were saying 
that you mustn’t have complete trade union power.60  
 
Allied to this was a supreme belief in and support for the ‘rule of law’. In cases such as 
the so-called Shrewsbury Two’, jailed for picketing offences in late 1973, and the rebel 
Clay Cross councillors, penalised for defiance of the Conservative Housing Finance Act, 
Jenkins and his followers were clearly of the view that ‘no-one is entitled to be above the 
law’. In the former case, Jenkins, now in his second stint as Labour Home Secretary in 
early 1974 and under pressure to automatically release the jailed pickets, argued that the 
‘Shrewsbury Two were claiming to be above the law at a time of great trade union 
power’, in the face of opposition from the Labour left, the TUC, and more ‘traditional’ 
centre-right colleagues in Cabinet.61  
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A re-evaluation of the wider economic role of trade unions in the face of damagingly 
high levels of inflation and public spending also remained essential to the evolving ‘small 
“l” liberal wing of social democrats’. Even more vital to some were the perceived 
dangers of related ‘libertarian aspects of trade union power’. According to David 
Marquand: 
 
the trade unions got into an extremely bad attitude in that period from the 
point of view of freedom of speech and conscience, and…the attitude of a 
large number of members of the cabinet on the right…what I used to think of 
as the Callaghan right didn’t care about all this…they were anxious to get the 
approval of Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon to the incomes policy and they 
didn’t mind how many concessions they made to illiberal policies in other 
fields…I think that was quite an important distinction between Crosland and 
Jenkins too.62 
 
Although more extreme revisionist positions could ‘overstate the influence of union 
leaders and…ignore the extent to which Scanlon and Jones played by the old “rules” of 
the relationship’, perceptions of trade union power and ‘claims of “solidarity” among 
some Labour ministers’ continued to represent a stumbling block, even a ‘brooding, 
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oppressive shadow, whose approval was as undesirable as it was deeply resented’, for 
‘radical’ post-revisionist social democrats ready to ‘shed the socialist ascription’.63 
Apparent to all was the belief that the Labour Party now appeared to exist ‘to give bribes 
to special people to achieve special objectives when these are damaging to the national 
interest’. The party and government was subject to the ‘exercise of naked power by 
entrenched groups’ able to pursue ‘illiberal and sectional’ policies ‘contrary to the 
interests of the bulk of the people in th[e] country’.64 
 
Conclusion: a ‘framework of defection’? 
 
Frustrated with the apparently unlimited expression of trade union influence within the 
party and wider industrial and economic sphere, the ‘trade union question’ remained a 
fundamental dilemma for Labour’s nascent post-revisionist social democratic faction, not 
least because it possessed critical industrial and economic policy implications and 
symbolised a narrow, sectional, class-based outlook and commitments inconsistent with a 
modernised political economy. What they perceived to be a new way of institutionalising 
trade union power in the party and country also represented a potential threat to 
parliamentary democracy and accountability and to the increasingly important priority of 
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protection of liberal freedoms. Through the Labour Party and government’s increasingly 
intimate links to the trade unions, they felt ‘at the beck and call of vested interests and of 
further excessive demands for public expenditure commitments, while being unable to 
firm up a certain and lasting arrangement over industrial productivity and inflation’. The 
increasingly assertive trade union presence in the party was ‘experienced by the Social 
Democrats not only in the obligations of policy but as an expression of class, style, and 
culture’.65 
 
Reaction and responses to the case study episodes identified above formed part of 
an evolving wider new post-revisionist critique of the trade union role and influence in 
the Labour Party and British industrial, economic and social culture. According to this 
critique, the trade unions represented a particular reflection of ‘the national cultural 
weaknesses of conservatism and resistance to change’. It was the trade unions who were 
taking the Labour government ‘down the path of a ‘half-hearted statism’, in which 
‘intervention was, more often than not, directed towards the subsidy of the inefficient’, 
and which, in their present state, were a considerable constraint on industrial 
modernisation.66 Consequently, for post-revisionist social democrats the ‘trade union 
question’ in British politics in the 1970s became one of how the Labour Party was to 
prise itself free of the constraints of trade unionism which, in turn, became linked to a 
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second question of how to achieve a realignment of British politics and a change in the 
adversarial two-party system. 
 
The question’s formulation was partly a reaction to the development of the 
political role of the trade unions as effectively an ‘estate of the realm’ within a ‘set of 
neo-corporatist arrangements’, which made it important to have a more representative 
trade union leadership and a willingness to regulate on behalf of the public interest.67 
Some acknowledged that government with consent had to develop these processes and 
involve the trade unions as ‘social partners’ but critically, in a pluralist society, their 
‘leaders…have to win the agreement of their followers, and this is the central issue’. 
Moreover, post-revisionist social democrats sensitive to the narrative of British economic 
decline from the mid-1960s interpreted corporatism, with its emphasis on consultation 
and consensus, as a significant aspect of this decline. They argued that for any sort of 
revival, the primacy of corporatism must be discarded and democracy allowed to 
flourish.68 
 
The question remained as to whether this could be accomplished within the 
confines of the Labour Party, or whether it would require an alternative, modernised 
vehicle of social democracy to ‘open up’ participation in the political sphere. It was their 
experience of Labour governments since the late 1960s which encouraged the belief that 
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an inherent danger to democracy, freedom and economic efficiency lay in the ability of 
the trade union movement to bend governments to their will or, at least, in the inability of 
the Labour Party and Labour governments to resist and regulate trade union influence and 
pressure. This ‘rumbling concern’ over trade union power in the Labour Party and over 
government moved to a climax in the ten years following Labour’s failed In Place of 
Strife legislation in 1969, and the fact that Callaghan’s Labour government in 1979 was 
essentially the third ‘to have been destroyed…by the trade unions…raised a spectre 
which haunted the Social Democrats’.69 
 
The seemingly irresolvable ‘trade union question’ in Labour and British politics from 
the late 1960s became a central feature of the collective reflections on philosophy, policy 
and party of Labour’s ‘radical’ post-revisionist social democrats. Increasingly, they felt 
frustrated and constrained within the so-called “rules” of the Labour Movement’. It was 
the ensuing feelings of confinement and impotence over this and bitter internal disputes 
and divisions over membership of the EEC, intensified by subsequent intra-party 
constitutional debates and reforms, which themselves consolidated the institutional 
position and significance of the trade unions in the party, that provided a crucial ‘sub-
text’ of their departure and the formation of the new SDP.70 The apparent disparity 
between the values and preferences of modern social democracy and the enduring 
principles enshrined in these ‘rules’ now appeared to represent arguably the deepest gulf 
in British politics. It reflected the ultimate desire of the former to initiate a permanent 
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shift of power from organised labour to democratic government, which would very likely 
now need to involve a departure from the present party system to strengthen the ‘radical 
centre’.71 In their current predicament, they were unable to ‘initiate the industrial 
relations policies…or the incomes policy they felt to be necessary; nor could they 
produce a Bill of Rights. Each in some way breached the ‘rules’ of freedom’, and they 
were now ‘convinced that the Labour Party was beyond salvation for the sort of things 
that [they] believed in’.72 With their subsequent defection to the SDP, the new Social 
Democrats could make the question of (restriction of) trade union power a central 
consideration and tenet of the new party’s political identity in its founding statement, the 
Limehouse Declaration. It clearly signalled the tensions and dilemma of the enhanced 
trade union position in Labour’s political culture and the deeper, longer-term roots of 
their departure from the Labour Party in 1981: 
 
A handful of trade union leaders can now dictate the choice of a future Prime 
Minister. The [1981 Wembley] Conference disaster is the culmination of a long 
process by which the Labour Party has moved steadily away from its roots in 
the people of this country and its commitment to Parliamentary government.73  
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